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Mainland China’s film industry finds itself at a critical 
juncture.  Market capitalism and booming economic 
growth are transforming all aspects of Chinese society.  
This has profound implications for the creative industries.  
The film industry in particular is being affected by 
internationalization, globalization and the digital 
revolution.  As Ulysses found himself searching for a safe 
passage between Scylla and Charybdis - the twin perils 
that faced him as he steered his ship home – China’s film 
industry must find a safe path through the challenges 
facing it.  Developing copyright law, enforcing 
legislation, establishing a regulatory environment 
conducive to film production and confronting the effects 
of censorship will not be easy tasks.  However, Chinese 
cinema has already produced many high quality 
creative products.  Mainland China may yet give 
Hollywood a run for its money.   
 
Introduction: 
Until the 1980s Communist Party propaganda movies 
distributed at low cost by the government were the only 
film products readily available to mainland viewers.  The 
Open Door Policy and engagement with the outside 
world have changed this situation.  The range of mass 
media products available to consumers has grown 
rapidly over the past two decades and shows no sign of 
slowing.  Technological innovations such as the VCD and 
DVD and a booming market economy have radically 
altered audience experiences of film, in particular.  These 
developments have brought major changes to the 
economics of film production in China.   
 
Although the technological and commercial 
environment in which films are produced and consumed 
has changed dramatically over the past twenty years 
government attitudes have been slower to shift.  The film 
sector is struggling to make the transition from 
propaganda machine to commercially focused 
entertainment industry.  Quotas for foreign film imports 
are set to increase steadily under the provisions of the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) 
agreement and film studios must now find their own 
funding and compete with a growing range of 
entertainment options for audience dollars.  Filmmakers 
also remain the subject of complex regulations designed 
to produce works consistent with the propaganda goals 
of the state, rather than the tastes of consumers.   
 
At the same time powerful illegal distribution channels 
have sprung up all over China’s cities in the form of 
‘pirate’ DVD outlets which stock an enormous range of 
foreign and domestic titles.  As piracy is not regulated by 
the government, pirated films avoid the bureaucratic 
web of import quotas, censorship requirements and 
distribution bottlenecks that plague the rest of the 
industry.  Ready access to cheap pirated products, 
combined with a market economy and growing 
disposable incomes have combined to give consumers 
more power than ever before to simply ignore the state’s 
official cultural policies (Kraus, 2004a). 
 
This paper examines the twin challenges of piracy and 
regulation in the process of film industry transformation 
now taking place in mainland China.  It reports on the 
author’s discussions with Chinese directors and producers 
working across a range of mainland film genres.  The 
picture that emerges is one of a complex, highly 
stratified industry struggling to find its feet in a changing 
environment.  The success of Chinese filmmakers at 
international film festivals in recent years has made it 
clear that China possesses some incredibly creative, 
talented filmmakers.  But talent alone will not be enough 
to create a commercially successful industry.  Before 
China can emerge as a commercial film player capable 
of competing in a globalizing market, questions about 
the purpose of film and the government’s role in the 
industry must be resolved.  Distribution mechanisms and 
the legal infrastructure surrounding the industry also need 
to be developed. 
 
 The Shape of the Industry: 
China’s film industry is currently operating as a highly 
stratified sector.  Rather than a single, coherent system of 
production and distribution it is arguable that the 
‘Chinese film industry’ is actually at least two distinct film 
industries.  From a market perspective, film productions in 
China can be broadly divided into four categories: 
legitimate mainland films, underground mainland films, 
co-productions, and foreign imports.  From a legal or 
administrative perspective these four categories could 
be further simplified into just two types of filmmaking 
activity: legal and illegal, legitimate and underground.   
 
Legitimate Industry – within the scope of government 
regulation:  
• State owned studios 
• Foreign co-productions 
• Quota Imports 
• Independent productions 
 
Underground Film – outside the scope of government 
regulation 
• Films made or distributed without government 
approval 
• Generally tolerated but not encouraged by the 
state 
• Distributed either internationally or illegally through 
pirate DVD outlets 
 
Diasporic filmmakers and film productions from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan also exist.  However, for the purposes 
of this paper only directors and producers currently 
working within the PRC were interviewed.   
 
Chinese Studios: 
Legitimate studios make up a major layer of cinema 
production in today’s PRC.  These studios operate with 
the official approval and support of the Chinese 
authorities and films are funded by a combination of 
state subsidies and private investors.  Legitimately 
produced films are generally aimed at domestic 
audiences and must obtain pre and post production 
approval from that State Administration of Radio Film 
and Television’s Film Bureau.  If they are successful in 
obtaining this approval they are permitted to screen in 
cinemas – the vast majority of which are state owned.  
The government dictates the price of cinema entry 
(Yang, 2004) and it has only recently become possible for 
private investors to participate in the cinema industry.  
Even now this is only permitted in seven of China’s largest 
cities.  At the time of writing this paper only one privately 
run ‘megaplex’ had been opened in China (Warner 
Brothers marches into China's cinema market, 2004).   
 
While all legitimate productions remain the subject of 
heavy government regulation in terms of content, they 
must also deal with pressure to reward commercial 
investors with box office success.  During the early 1980s 
the film funding system made it possible for some studios 
to support productions such as Tian Zhuangzhuang’s On 
the Hunting Ground which sold only two prints  for 
archival collection rather than general distribution and 
The Horse Thief which sold only seven prints (Zhang, 
2004).  At various times during this period studios enjoyed 
relatively high levels of freedom and discretion when 
choosing projects.  Visionary studio heads were able to 
direct funding to the experimental, artistically driven and 
often commercially disastrous projects that came to 
characterize the emerging ‘fifth generation’ - directors 
such as Chen Kaige, Zhang Yimou and Tian 
Zhuanzhuang – many of whom also worked as 
‘underground’ directors at times.   
 
By the late 1980s changes in China’s economy, the rapid 
growth of alternative forms of entertainment such as 
television, karaoke bars and concerts combined with 
economic reforms to change things considerably.  
Studios were forced to pay greater attention to the 
commercial viability of projects.  Yingjin Zhang writes: 
 
Previously, in the centralised planned 
economy, studios produced features 
according to the quotas approved by 
the Film Bureau and received a flat fee 
of RMB 700,000 per title from China Film 
Corporation regardless of box office 
takings.  During the 1980s, however, 
new reform measures changed this 
system of guaranteed purchases, and 
the distributors now either paid RMB 
9,000 per print or split the revenue by 
the pre-agreed percentage points (Luo 
et, al. 1992: 2: 333).  Either way, the 
emergent market economy pressured 
studios to consider film's box-office 
success before it went into production - 
a situation which studio heads and 
filmmakers reluctantly learned to 
confront (Zhang, 2004). 
 
Commercial pressure on Chinese filmmakers and state 
owned studios has continued to grow.  Today Chinese 
directors are expected to take responsibility for financial 
outcomes, as well as creative and ideological decisions.  
According to Wulan Tana, the monetary success of 
projects is considered more important than either critical 
acclaim or film festival awards:   
 
…the most important thing is not to find 
investment but to earn the investment back.  
My film may not be awarded a prize, but it 
must be rewarded with cash.  In the past, the 
director did not take any responsibility for 
financial problems which would be solved by 
the film studio and the investor.  The film 
industry in China has been totally subject to the 





Films made in China by foreign studios for both foreign 
and domestic audiences are also emerging as a 
significant component of the industry.  ‘Co-productions’ 
are an officially approved class of film, and describe a 
cooperative arrangement between two studios, usually 
a mainstream Chinese studio and a foreign production 
company.  The number of co-productions between 
Hong Kong and the mainland, in particular, is increasing 
rapidly.(Law, 2004)  The Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) between Hong Kong and Beijing, 
which came into effect in 2004, allows Hong Kong films to 
bypass the mainland’s 20 film import quota.  As long as 
Hong Kong studios employ sufficient numbers of 
mainland staff in their productions they can be classified 
as Chinese productions, rather than foreign imports.(Law, 
2004)   
 
As with other legitimately produced films in China all co-
productions require pre-production approval from the 
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television’s Film 
Bureau.  They also require post-production approval from 
the same authority before they can be distributed within 
the mainland.  Furthermore, the Film Bureau stipulates 
that regardless of who owns overseas copyright the 
Chinese government still has the power to decide 
whether a movie can participate in foreign festivals, and 
only a film’s producer (rather than investors or 
distributors) has the right to apply to attend foreign film 
festivals (Hendryx, 1996/97).   
 
As the Forbidden City Film Co. discovered at great 
expense when making Balzac and the Little Chinese 
Seamstress pre-production approval provides no 
guarantee that a film will be approved for post-
production release (Z. Wang & Wang, 2004).  
The film bureau possesses the power to quash projects at 
any stage by denying them censorship approval.  
Directors and producers are acutely aware of the fact 
that the board’s decisions are made subjectively and 
often relate to the personal tastes of its members.  As a 
result, no one can be sure of what these limits are.  In 
today’s economic climate this means that few studios 
are willing to risk projects that might offend.  It is common 
to err on the side of caution.  Not many filmmakers can 
afford to test the limits of the system.   
 
Richard Kraus points out that post production censorship 
effectively turns political risks into economic risks (Kraus, 
2004a) – all the greater for poorly funded studios.   
  
A publisher may well be stuck with 
thousands of books that can no 
longer be sold, or a troupe may 
have to cancel a drama production 
before it can recover its investment.  
As China's economy becomes more 
market dependant, these risks 
increase.  Producers and publishers 
may want to avoid the financial risk 




Legally Imported Productions: 
From 1994 informal domestic quotas were applied to 
foreign films, stipulating that no more than ten films per 
year could be imported from outside the Chinese 
mainland (Lancaster, 2001).  One of the concessions that 
China made when it joined the WTO in 2001 was its 
agreement to steadily loosen quotas on the import of 
wholly foreign works.  While these quotas are increasing, 
they still remain extremely low.  At present, just 20 films 
per year are approved for legitimate distribution 
("Official: No ceiling on US film imports," 2004).  In 2003 
80% of China’s box office revenue came from just 20 
imported blockbusters (Hua, 2004).  This figure is shocking.  
However, 80% of film revenue being accounted for by 
foreign works only represents a ten percent increase from 
the 70% of revenue which just ten films accounted for 
prior to WTO entry (Lancaster, 2001). 
 
Another development that seems likely to affect the 
statistical picture of how Chinese films are performing 
against foreign imports has been the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) which came into effect 
on 1 January 2004 (The Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement, 2004).  The agreement makes it possible 
for productions by Hong Kong studios to be distributed in 
China as ‘domestic productions’, exempting them from 
foreign import quotas (The Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement, 2004).  
 
Underground Filmmakers: 
‘Underground films’ are films that are produced and 
distributed ‘illegally’ – that is, without government permits 
or approval.  Originally the term ‘underground film’ 
referred to films banned by the Chinese government on 
moral or political grounds.  However, the slow, complex 
bureaucratic requirements of working within the legal 
sector has prompted some producers dealing with 
innocuous topics to bypass the Film Bureau and release 
their productions illegally.  This has continued to be the 
case in spite of the fact that the Chinese government 
now permits filmmakers to produce films outside the 
studio system (Ruggieri, 2002).   
 
As Chen Daming noted with some bitterness, 
‘underground films’ have received a much warmer 
reception on the international film circuit than legitimate 
productions made with Chinese government support.  
Chen believes that a large part of this has been the result 
of the West’s thirst for images of China that conform with 
stereotypes of hardship, poverty and oppression (Chen, 
2004).  Director of the underground film Blind Shaft (2003 
Golden Bear winner) Li Yang, on the other hand, argues 
that it is not possible to make films about life in China that 
are entertaining, honest or critical of the present system 
without working as an underground filmmaker (Yang, 
2004).   
 
In many ways the emergence of the underground film 
market represents a natural commercial reaction to tight 
political and cumbersome bureaucratic control of the 
domestic film market.  Studio based director Wulan Tana 
points out that having films released legitimately within 
China is so difficult that some directors may simply have 
decided that making films for this market is too risky and 
expensive:   
 
More than 200 films are made each year and 
only about one tenth of them can be shown 
in the cinema.  The remaining 180 films have 
to look for overseas markets to survive.  It is 
inevitable and it will promote overseas 
distribution.  It is a reasonable result of a 
Chinese film industry which under heavy 
pressure from Hollywood films.  The 
appearance of underground films is 
necessary.  Some underground films have 
given up the domestic film market and 
audience.  They are brought abroad to win 
prizes.  I think if these films could get enough 
recognition, they would have not been made 
underground.  I believe that every director 
wants his film be seen by people of his own 
country (Wulan, 2004). 
 
This means that ninety percent of China’s legitimate, as 
well as 100% of its ‘underground’ films are not distributed 
through the domestic cinema system at all.  Some, such 
as Where Have All The Flowers Gone go directly to DVD 
(Ruggieri, 2002).  Others, such as Daming Chen’s 
Manhole must take their chances in the highly 
competitive international distribution market. 
 
In spite of their inability to access the cinema system, 
China’s underground filmmakers are currently 
responsible for a significant proportion of Chinese 
productions available to domestic and international 
audiences.  Domestic audiences gain access to 
underground films via DVD outlets that also distribute 
pirated foreign works.  According to both Olympic 
director Hu Bo and underground filmmaker Li Yang, the 
government’s attitude towards underground filmmakers 
appears to have softened in recent years.  The 
government now acknowledges the existence of 
underground filmmakers and, at the moment, 
discourages but nonetheless appears to be willing 
tolerate their activities (Bo, 2004a; Yang, 2004). 
 
Relationship between piracy and censorship: 
The relationship between censorship policies and film 
piracy has been widely commented on.  Director of the 
Forbidden City Film Co., Wang Zhebin and her husband 
Wang Xingdong unequivocally support this claim.  Wang 
and Wang point out that studios find themselves under 
pressure to become involved in illegal distribution 
networks in order to recoup their investment if the worst 
happens and they are denied the right to distribute their 
films through legitimate channels.   
 
The Chinese partner in the co-production of Balzac and 
the Little Chinese Seamstress, the Forbidden City Film 
Company was completely prevented from recovering its 
investment through legitimate channels when the 
censorship board decided not to approve the film for 
domestic distribution (Z. Wang & Wang, 2004).  The 
Forbidden City Film Company invested heavily in the 
production, expecting to recoup their money when the 
film was released in China.  Under the co-production 
agreement Forbidden City were given the right to profits 
from domestic distribution but had no right to income 
generated by the film’s release outside China.  As a 
result the censorship board’s failure to approve the film 
left Wang and her studio with no means of legitimately 
recovering any of their investment.    
 
The relationship between piracy and censorship was 
highlighted by the fact that the studio was also offered 
1,000,000 RMB by a ‘pirate’ distributor for master copies 
of the production and the ‘exclusive right’ to distribute 
the film within China (Z. Wang & Wang, 2004).  All that 
Wang needed to do was provide the pirate group with a 
master of the film plus the promotional materials already 
in her possession.  After much soul-searching she 
decided to turn this offer down - her conscience 
prevented her from going ahead with the deal.  This 
incident illustrates the complex relationship between 
what many have argued is overly strict regulation of 
legitimate distribution channels in China and a vibrant, 
commercially driven, wholly unregulated ‘pirate’ 
entertainment market.   
 
The costs of operating in the legitimate sector are high in 
terms of both risk and opportunity.  As a result, it is 
tempting for for studios, producers and investors to 
participate in various aspects of the underground 
industry.  The rise of the market economy, the growing 
power of the consumer, technological development, 
and failure to enforce cultural policies which are both 
unrealistic and impractical has all but destroyed the 
state’s power to control what people watch.  Wang and 
the Forbidden City Film Co. are by no means the first or 
the only studio to have found themselves in this situation.  
It is widely reported within the industry that Chinese 
directors know that their productions will be pirated and 
so simply sell the ‘right’ to distribute illegally to a pirate 
group for a lump sum in order to recoup some money 
from the practice.     
 
The legacy of the past: 
Until quite recently, Chinese cinema existed in the 
context of a media wholly dominated by the state.  Films 
were produced by state run studios and were 
understood primarily as an educational tool for the 
masses rather than as a creative or commercial medium.  
As such Chinese films generally dealt with moral and 
ideological themes.  Audiences had little or no power to 
decide what films they would watch or, to a very large 
extent, when they would watch them.  Ordinary citizens 
had no access to foreign films.  One of the greatest 
attractions of elite institutions such as the Beijing Film 
Academy was its students’ ability to access international 
productions.  Although the situation has changed 
dramatically for Chinese consumers, in many ways is 
seems that the state’s view of the role that film should 
play has not.   
 
In the past, Chinese government 
regarded culture as an educational 
method through which people 
learned to be patriotic and upright, 
or as a kind of life or entertainment. 
This is a tradition.  Even in ancient 
China, ideologists thought that 
culture was an important path 
leading to ethical or political 
education. However, things have 
changed since the reform and 
opening up. Now, culture in China 
bears two responsibilities. One is the 
function of education; another is its 
function as an industry. I think the 
government puts educational 
function at the first place, but its 
function as an industry makes it 
regard market and profits as the 
primary concern (S. Wang, 2004). 
 
The new economic imperatives faced by filmmakers 
have, of course, given rise to the need for an intellectual 
property system capable of allowing filmmakers and 
investors to realise a return on their investment.  However, 
China’s intellectual property system was not only 
neglected under Communism. The idea that individuals 
or companies would own an exclusive right to a creative 
product was in many cases viewed as a notion that 
conflicted directly with the goals of the state.  Media 
products created by state owned bodies were 
considered common property(Qu, 2002) and studios 
themselves saw little or no need to ‘protect’ their 
products from unauthorized use.  Film studios operated 
as ‘factories’ responsible for producing a certain number 
of films per year.  
 
Both revenues and audiences were guaranteed in the 
sense that the state was the only purchaser of film 
products and the only source of industry finance.  Films 
were made in order to provide audiences with 
ideological and moral lessons in an entertaining context, 
to motivate and to uplift the audience, to stir patriotic 
feelings and to encourage pride in the achievements of 
the nation.  In the absence of consumer choice and 
pressure to maximize box office takings, audience tastes 
and demands had almost no impact on either studio 
funding for future productions or the content of films.   
 
The concept of ‘piracy’ simply did not exist.  On the 
contrary, the widest possible distribution of films was seen 
as a positive outcome for studios as it meant films were 
reaching a larger audience – an approach reflected in 
both the theory and practice of copyright law during this 
period.  To this day, China’s copyright law contains a 
clause dictating that any material published in a state 
media outlet can be used without either payment or 
permission by all other state media groups (Qu, 2002).  
 
The approach to an individual’s ability to ‘own’ 
intellectual or creative products put into place by the 
CCP prior to 1979 fit comfortably with many of the 
Confucian notions of learning and creativity, as well as 
imperial approaches to publishing.  In To Steal a Book is 
an Elegant Offence William Alford argues that China has 
never developed an indigenous counterpart to 
copyright law (Alford, 1995).  Alford notes this as ironic, 
given that China is credited with the invention of ink, 
paper and the printing press – technologies central to 
the development of copyright in the West.  Nonetheless, 
while various imperial Chinese governments developed 
controls over printed works, they were motivated by a 
desire to control the dissemination of sensitive material 
rather than to facilitate commerce or promote creativity 
(Alford, 1995).   
 
The CCP’s view of intellectual property as common 
property which offered the greatest benefits to society if 
it was used and shared without restriction did nothing to 
contradict or displace traditional Confucian notions that 
copying directly from the work of others was a 
compliment to the author, rather than an infringement of 
his or her ‘natural’ rights.  As a result free copying from 
the work of other approved authors and artists was not 
only tolerated but encouraged (Alford, 1995).  
Restrictions surrounding publication or dissemination of 
works, including film, were aimed at suppressing dissident 
views and ensuring that works that were published 
accorded with the preferences of the state, rather than 
protecting the rights of individual property owners.  
Although the Open Door Policy was announced in 1979, 
formal copyright law and the development of a court 
system did not become significant factors in China’s 
intellectual property environment until the 1990s.   
 
According to Wang Shi, director of the Chinese Culture 
Promotion Society, these days: 
 
In China, piracy is very popular.  About ninety 
percent of disks sold in Chinese market are 
pirated disks.  The situation in Taiwan is better; 
only half of disks in the market are pirated. In the 
aspect of software, there are more pirated 
products. If a legitimate software costs hundreds 
of thousand RMB, a pirated one only costs one 
thousand RMB. Not many people can afford the 
legitimate one. However, people buy pirated 
products not only because of their economic 
capability, but also out of their vague 
consciousness of copyright. Maybe all people 
know that piracy will harm those practitioners 
(writers, composers or film directors), but they 
may also think that this harm is tiny to those 
wealthy practitioners. Since the profit is too high, 
almost nobody can resist the temptation. Not 
long ago, my American counterparts told me 
that their major piracy problem is the music 
download from internet. Our major problem is 
piracy of books and audio and visual products (S. 
Wang, 2004).   
 
A number of scholarly authors including Alford and Qu 
have also argued that the historical absence of 
copyright law in China means that there has been little 
opportunity for consciousness of intellectual property 
issues or rights to develop.  As a result, the task of 
reforming attitudes to intellectual property is formidable.  
As in every market, consumers view access to a wide 
variety of cheap, high quality pirated DVDs as something 
which benefits rather than harms their interests.  Most 
consumers of pirated film products in China have little 
sense that piracy has any impact on the production of 
film.  It has also been widely observed that one reason 
for failure to deal with copyright issues in the courts is a 
serious shortage of judges familiar with copyright theory 
and its application.(Qu, 2002)  Although political 
awareness of intellectual property rights is growing 
rapidly, building a culture which supports copyright 
enforcement takes both time and the strong 
commitment of policy-makers.   
 
Shifts in the Law: 
In December 2003 China enacted a new regulation 
designed to liberalise the film industry.  The regulation 
removes film production and distribution from the 
‘prohibited’ category for foreign investment and allows 
foreign investors to own up to 49% equity in joint venture 
film production companies set up with existing state-
owned film production organizations(China Update, 
2004).  The regulation will also allow domestic private 
investors to set up film, technology and distribution 
companies as well as to invest in an operate cinema 
lines.  Furthermore, the regulation allows all of this to be 
done without co-ownership by a state owned partner – a 
major step in allowing private players into China’s 
domestic film market.     
 
Appropriately defined intellectual property rights play an 
important role in securing the long-term profitability of 
modern economies.  Ideally, a well-designed intellectual 
property system will reduce negative externalities, allow 
parties to enjoy the benefits of their work and protect 
resources held by a community in common (Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2002).  In the United States copyright laws 
were originally enacted with the hope that they would 
promote literature and creativity, and so foster and 
protect society’s most valuable resources.(Samuels, 
2000)  While most commentators agree that an 
intellectual property system is capable of providing a 
nation’s economy and the creative communities that 
exist within it many benefits, much debate surrounds the 
question of what constitutes the most efficient means of 
regulating intellectual property rights.  Drahos and 
Braithwaite suggest that ‘efficiency’ as it relates to 
intellectual property rights is generally understood as a 
balance between rules of appropriation and rules of 
diffusion.  On the one hand, intellectual property 
protections that are too strong result in excessive 
monopoly costs.  Protection that is too weak, on the 
other hand, may lead to excessive ‘free riding’, which 
may in turn result in under investment in innovation.  The 
challenge for any legislature is finding a balance 
between these two extremes (Drahos & Braithwaite, 
2002). 
 
Although there is no doubt that the development of 
strong creative industries, including film is closely linked to 
the existence and enforceability of intellectual property 
rights, the issues threatening China’s film industry are 
more complex than the question of copyright law alone.  
Enforcing copyright is but one of many challenges faced 
by domestic film-makers.  Pirates have little interest in 
manufacturing a market for films or directors – and so the 
productions that are targeted tend to be those that are 
already popular.  According to Wulan Tana: 
 
As a relatively young director, compared with 
those famous directors like Zhang Yimou or Chen 
Kaige, my films are not so well-known. This is quite 
natural. Every famous director has this period 
when he or she is nobody. Maybe a several years 
later, I will be as famous as they and my films will 
have many audiences, but now, my films are not 
well-known enough to be pirated, not like Zhang 
Yimou or Chen Kaige’s films which will be pirated 
as soon as they are made (Wulan, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, the film and television industries remain the 
subject of more censorship and production regulation 
than any other industry in China.(Kraus, 2004a)  The 
relationship between production, popularity and 
consumption, that is, between producers and the 
market, remains so heavily mediated by the state that 
for many filmmakers being pirated is the least of their 
worries: 
 
… the biggest problem is not piracy but the 
system of censorship, and the second is that 
there is not a film market. It makes great 
difference: film as an industrial product or as a 
tool of political propaganda. As an industrial 
product, it needs a market; but now in China it is 
a tool of political propaganda—all cinemas 
belong to the government (Yang, 2004). 
 
While the central government withdrew direct financial 
support for state owned studios in the 1980s it continues 
to apply strict regulations to the works that these houses 
can legitimately produce (Wan & Kraus, 2002).  Unlike 
other forms of popular media such as newspaper and 
television, film remains the subject of pre-production 
censorship.  Even if filmmakers are given permission to 
shoot, there is no guarantee that they will be able to 
obtain permission to release the film through China’s 
state owned cinemas.  The film bureau possesses 
absolute power to either approve or axe any work.  
Filmmakers and their studios possess no legal rights to 
challenge or appeal these decisions.  Richard Kraus 
warns against adopting a stereotyped view of the 
Chinese state as a monolithic force, smothering 
creativity, expression and artistic development in China 
(Kraus, 2004a).  Kraus cautions: 
 
However dense the interpenetration 
of culture and politics, one must not 
imagine the manipulative hand of 
the state at every artistic turn.  
Chinese movies, for instance, can 
turn out badly because of political 
interference, but they can also fail 
because of indifferent direction, 
tasteless artists, or technically inferior 
equipment (Kraus, 2004b). 
 
Nonetheless, the relationship between government 
regulation and an industry’s development in the context 
of a highly competitive, commercializing market cannot 
be ignored.  Regardless of ideology, China faces 
important questions about the role of this sector, and the 
extent to which it will be allowed to develop on 
commercial rather than moral or political terms.  There is 
no doubt that the government’s attitude to the role of 
film and the purpose of industry regulation will have 
important implications for the commercial strength of the 
sector in the future. 
 
The decision to enact a formal copyright law in 1992 
represented a major shift in the government’s attitude to 
the role of media and recognition that intellectual 
products, including film, exist within a commercial 
context.  However, although the Chinese government 
has withdrawn its financial support for the film sector and 
formally accepted that intellectual property rights should 
be applied to film products, it continues to view the film 
industry as something other than a purely commercial 
industry.  The government’s view of film as much more 
than a commercial product has created a situation in 
which a formidable regulatory framework, combined 
with legitimate distribution channels incapable of 
meeting consumer demands and low levels of law 
enforcement are undoubtedly contributing to the 
ubiquity of DVD piracy.     
 
Filmmakers and Censorship: A broad Church  
Predictably, views about censorship’s impact on the 
industry (at least the views interviewees were willing to 
put on tape) varied quite widely.  According to Wulan 
Tana, winner of last year’s ‘Golden Rooster’ award: 
 
Nowadays, China Film Bureau has a very 
open policy. There are no restrictions on the 
themes of the films in China. So long as your 
films can be accepted by audience and are 
not too far beyond the moral standard, you 
can make any kind of films. Chinese directors 
are not requested to make political films and 
would never be banned to make films unless 
their films contain too many unhealthy or 
negative things (Wulan, 2004). 
 
Wulan is a director working in mainstream Chinese 
cinema.  Her comments contrasted strongly with those of 
underground director, Li Yang, who viewed censorship 
and distribution as the two biggest impediments to the 
development of China’s film industry, and as the driving 
force behind the ‘underground’ industry. 
However, while Wulan does not view censorship as a 
major problem for China’s film industry, her 
understanding of the role of competition and the 
industry as a whole, her views are clearly shaped by her 
position as a member of an established filmmaking elite, 
enjoying the rare privilege of access to China’s 
legitimate distribution channels.  Although Wulan also 
identified the cost of cinema entry and the number of 
cinemas available to audiences as important, she 
identified the most grave concern for Chinese 
filmmakers as the threat of big budget foreign imports.  
While competition does put pressure on Chinese 
directors to increase the standards of their productions, it 
is pressure that the majority are ill-equipped to meet in 
the present funding environment: 
 
The advantage is that it can give pressure and 
incentive upon Chinese directors. They will be 
aware that without good quality, their products 
may not be shown in the cinema, and they have 
to try their best to fulfil their jobs … on the other 
hand, it is unfair for a film with low investment to 






Few Chinese directors can obtain the investment 
of two hundred million RMB as Zhang Yimou 
does. Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, who do not 
represent typical Chinese directors, are quite 
exceptional in Chinese film circle. Most of 
Chinese directors' situations are similar to mine. 
We are not afraid of competing with those 
having the same investment (Wulan, 2004). 
 
Wu appears to have accepted the existence of the 
pirate DVD market as a fact of life which she cannot 
really change.  Furthermore, perhaps tellingly, her films 
have proven to be unpopular with the pirates.  As a 
result, her business model is based primarily on cinema 
revenue.   
 
According to Li Yang, a director working in an entirely 
different context, censorship is the major driver behind 
the development of China’s ‘underground’ film industry.  
Li lived and worked in Germany for forty years before 
returning to China to make films.  In his view, the 
censorship system is unpredictable, impractical and 
unfair.  As a result, many Chinese filmmakers are simply 
finding other ways of making their films. 
 
The underground films in China are made 
because of the system of censorship. The 
censorship system is very ridiculous, for there is 
no standard. They say, “Your films are illegal”, 
and then I ask, “What is the relevant law of 
film? Which clause my films violate?” No, 
there is no specific law. So the censorship is 
quite cruel. If they say your film is “illegal”, 
then it is “illegal” (Yang, 2004). 
 
In Li’s view, the censors’ insistence that filmmakers create 
only positive images of China is stifling artistic expression 
and driving talented individuals away from the 
legitimate film industry, and often away from China.  Li 
believes that many talented individuals have been 
forced to make their films underground because they 
are unwilling to comply with the government’s demands 
that they only portray wholesome, positive images of life 
in China.  In his words: 
 
You cannot make a film in which there is love 
triangle. Then if you make a film about 
ordinary people’s life in small lanes, they 
would say you are smearing the image of 
China because the streets in the films are so 
dirty. Then what else can you do? (Yang, 
2004) 
 
As he points out, these types of restrictions contradict 
any notion of film as an entertainment industry, where 
profits and audience tastes dictate production 
decisions.   
 
The restrictions on artistic liberty created by overt 
censorship are further compounded by a system of 
quotas for genres of production.  Each year, studios must 
produce a certain number of “major melody” and 
“message” films, films that carry CCP propaganda 
messages (Wan & Kraus, 2002).  However, as 
propaganda films rarely attract large crowds, these 
requirements have only served to deepen the financial 
crisis facing Chinese filmmakers.  Although the 
government claims that it wants to make money out of 
films, it continues to insist that expensive propaganda 
films which are virtually guaranteed to be box office 
flops are produced.  Li points to the fact that the 
Chinese government now intends to produce a film 
called Deng Xiaoping in Paris as stunning proof that this 
type of policy continues to play a major role in the 
funding and production decisions of the industry.   
 
Can you imagine who will watch it? Definitely 




The Interaction Between Piracy and Censorship: 
State owned studios are being made financially 
accountable to free market tastes in an environment in 
which they are handicapped by onerous censorship and 
content regulations.   This system places directors and 
producers in a difficult position.  Wang Zhebin, a female 
producer from one of China’s most prominent state 
owned film studios discussed this problem with particular 
anguish.  As mentioned earlier, according to Wang, in 
2001 her studio entered into a co-production agreement 
with a French studio for the production of Balzac and the 
Little Chinese Seamstress.  The film received pre-
production approval, but was denied post production 
endorsement by the Film Bureau. (Z. Wang & Wang, 
2004). 
 
As a result, the Chinese co-production partner was 
unable to recover any of its investment in the production.  
This situation was made even more painful by the fact 
that the studio was approached by a pirate distribution 
group who offered to pay them one million RMB for the 
‘right’ to distribute the film on the mainland.  For this 
money Madame Wang needed only supply them with a 
master copy of the DVD and the promotional materials 
that accompanied the film.  She chose not to do this 
and the film eventually made its way into mainland DVD 
stores via Hong Kong.  However, according to Madame 
Wang this type of offer is common, and many studios do 
in fact choose to sell master copies to pirate distributors 
(Z. Wang & Wang, 2004).   
 
As Susan Ward discusses, in order for authentic, vibrant 
local film production to develop funding and resources 
are vital.  A climate in which film studios cannot afford to 
risk producing films that are unprofitable is not 
conducive to the development of authentic local 
cinema (Ward, 2003).  Although funding for Chinese 
cinema in the form of production subsidies for specific 
genres of production increased after 1989 and the 
number of Chinese films being produced grew from 88 in 
1998 to 147 in 2003 (Wan & Kraus, 2002) (Keane, Ryan, & 
Cunningham, 2004), cinema admission sales declined 
1.5 billion yuan in the mid 1990s to just 800 million yuan in 
2003.  This happened in spite of the fact that the 
incomes of most Chinese citizens grew dramatically and 
vividly reflects the inability of mainstream Chinese 
productions to compete in the box office. 
 
As these figures suggest, if China is to develop a film 
sector capable of driving economic growth, supporting 
new filmmakers and supplying local and regional 
audiences with films they want to watch it needs to do 
more than simply increase levels of government funding.  
A distribution system capable of making products 
available to audiences and profits available to 
producers is vital in any commercially driven sector.  So is 
the freedom for producers to respond to consumer 
demands.  In the case of film, the experience of other 
film industries also suggests that a regulatory framework 
supports the industry and encourages filmmakers and 
production houses to work in China also play a major 
role. 
 
At present piracy acts as a valuable distribution channel 
for censored works.  Distribution through pirate outlets 
allows audiences to obtain films quickly and cheaply 
without interference or even regulation by the 
government.  While foreign, particularly American, 
owners of intellectual property rights have been vocal in 
their calls for the government to crack down on this issue, 
legitimate Chinese filmmakers are also being affected.  
However, this is not the end of the story.   
 
As mentioned earlier another important aspect of 
China’s contemporary film industry is the ‘underground’ 
film movement.  Many underground films have been well 
received outside China, particularly on the International 
Film Festival circuit.  In spite of international critical 
acclaim, films made without the consent or approval of 
the Chinese authorities almost never enjoy rights to 
legitimate distribution within the PRC.  One example of 
this type of film is Li Yang’s Blind Shaft, which won a Silver 
Bear at the Berlin International Film Festival, among other 
honors.  Blind Shaft was filmed in China without the 
permission of the Chinese authorities and is only 
available to domestic audiences through pirate DVD 
outlets.   
 
According to Hu Bo, the director in charge of film 
productions surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics Blind 
Shaft was banned by the authorities because it failed to 
present China in a positive light.  In Hu’s words: 
 
The makers, the doers of those films purposely 
try to sabotage the ideology.  That kind of film 
was sure to get censorship.  Their vision, their 
strategy is very clear.  They try to show the 
dark side of the current society.  Obviously, 
they achieved their creative vision.  They won.  
But …, although it is very creative … 
government has one hundred percent of 
reasons to censor it.  Blockade it.  Because 
they felt it would hurt [their] image.  I think 
that’s their reason…. It’s very creative, but, I 
mean, I like the film in an artistic way, but the 
content, I think as an Olympic film producer, I 
don’t think its proper using this film as a 
national image, which is very negative (Bo, 
2004a).   
 
The film board’s decision to censor Blind Shaft highlights 
the clash between perceptions of the purpose of film 
that is plaguing the industry.  Directors such as Li Yang 
believe that film is a powerful medium capable of 
challenging audiences and documenting reality in a 
society undergoing enormous social, political and 
economic changes.  Blind Shaft’s point is that not 
everyone is a winner in the context of China’s rapid 
economic development.  Many Chinese are being left 
behind.  Some are being forced to make impossible 
decisions in the face of real poverty and inequality and 
in these contexts morality is a complex issue.   
 
Hu Bo, a director who trained at the New York Film 
School and who refers proudly to his relationship with 
Zhang Yimou, agrees wholeheartedly with the 
government’s view that one of the primary obligations of 
Chinese cinema is the promotion of ‘positive images of 
China’.  Hu sympathizes with the artistic desires of 
underground directors.  However, he does not believe 
that the government’s present approach to censorship is 
the cause of the industry’s inability to produce 
commercial successes.  According to Hu, censorship is 
just one factor in the highly complex environment of 
finance and regulation that directors and producers 
must navigate to get their picture made.  Hu points out 
that directors of mainstream productions seldom enjoy 
complete artistic freedom or autonomy in any film 
market.  Even in Hollywood, scripts are altered or 
rejected because they don’t match formulas.  Although 
this is certainly true, one key difference between the 
vetting of scripts by Hollywood studios keen to produce a 
box office smash and Chinese censorship boards is that 
audience taste, as it is measured by profit, drives 
decisions in the Hollywood system. 
 
In any case, Hu doesn’t believe that censorship is having 
a negative impact on audience perceptions of Chinese 
films.  He argues that audiences – either consciously or 
unconsciously – have developed tastes which coincide 
with those of the censors.  Hu believes that Chinese 
audiences have grown used to watching films that tell a 
certain kind of story, and which have been produced in 
a certain way.  He believes that this means they do not 
notice the impact of censorship in the same way that 
foreign audiences might.  In his words: 
 
… right now, I don’t think people are very 
attentive to the censorship situation, but they 
consciously or unconsciously like to look at 
things this way because it has become a 
habit (Bo, 2004a). 
 
Hu Bo’s belief that Chinese audiences aren’t alive to the 
impact of censorship on film is contradicted by Chen 
Daming.  Daming believes that the sophistication of 
Chinese audiences is often underestimated.  One of the 
benefits of piracy has been that ordinary Chinese 
consumers have had the chance to develop both the 
habit of watching films, and increasingly refined tastes.  
According to Chen, high quality European films are 
much more popular with ordinary Chinese than 
mainstream ‘Hollywood Trash’.(Chen, 2004)   
 
In any case, at present, determining the tastes of 
Chinese audiences remains a highly subjective process.  
In contrast to the cut-throat, profit driven focus of the US 
film sector which maps, researches and tests audiences 
in ways that make at least some attempt at objectivity, 
decisions about the likely tastes of Chinese audiences 
remain highly subjective – often based on the opinions of 
a handful of people involved in the production (and 
censorship) of individual films.   
 
The high cost of cinema entry and the low cost of DVDs 
in China as a factor in consumers’ decision not to watch 
films in theatres has been widely commented on.  Other 
problems with the distribution mechanisms  
 
Hu Bo, Chen Daming and Li Yang and Wu Lantana all 
identified China’s film distribution system as a major 
sticking point for the development of the film industry.  At 
present, China has only one cinema for every 122,000 
people, compared to America, where there is a cinema 
for every 9,000 (Zhou, 2002).  Total box office revenues in 
China were only US$120 million in 2003, compared to US 
box office revenues of US$9.5 billion.("Regulator Monster 
Biffs Spiderman," 2004)   
 
.It makes great difference: film as an industrial 
product or as a tool of political propaganda. 
As an industrial product, it needs a market; 
but now in China it is a tool of political 
propaganda—all cinemas belong to the 
government. Chinese films do not have a 
market not because of piracy. Everybody 
knows pirated CD’s quality is not good, but 
why people don’t go to the cinema? 
Because the price of ticket is too high, about 
50-80 Yuan, which is almost the same as that 
in America or Australia. But Chinese people’s 
salary is only 1/10 of American people’s 
salary. There is no free market for the price of 
ticket is decided by the government, and 
nobody can change. The cinema belongs to 
the country, the Ministry of Culture. The 
distribution company also belongs to the 
country; private distribution company is not 
allowed to exist. So there is no film industry. 
Piracy is just a small problem (Yang, 2004). 
 
Arranging for the distribution of films through cinemas is 
currently complicated and difficult.  There is little to 
compel cinema operators to report ticket sales honestly.  
According to Chen, the producers of House of the Flying 
Daggers had to arrange for their own staff to supervise 
ticket sales to ensure that audience numbers were 
reported correctly.   
 
Although there have been some announcements by 
foreign operators about intentions to invest in cinema 
chains, multiplexes are yet to make it to China.  When 
they do, and when cinemas are able to offer a better 
range of films, Chen believes audiences will return.  As he 
points out, going to the cinema is about an experience – 
a night out, followed by dinner or a café.  However, at 
the moment, there is little to draw audiences away from 
pirate DVD shops offering literally hundreds of titles for 
very low prices, into cinemas which may be offering just 
two or three titles at comparatively high prices.  In the 
words of Chen: 
 
DVD stores are not about price.  They are 
about selection.  If you go to a DVD store you 
can choose from hundreds of DVDs.  If you go 
to a cinema you can choose from just two or 
three titles (Chen, 2004). 
 
Everyone seems to agree that illegal DVD shops won’t 
disappear anytime soon.  Hu Bo identifies profit making 
as holding a place in the market, and DVD shops as 
representing the profit driven sector of the cinema/DVD 
market.  Perhaps surprisingly, Li Yang, an underground 
filmmaker banned from legal distribution within China, 
also identifies the pirate DVD industry as one wholly 
driven by profit, and not one which he supports.   
 
… although many people have the idea of 
“copyright”, and they know piracy is illegal, 
they still do it because they want to earn 
money, just like the drug addicts. It has 
nothing to do with poverty; it is out of the 
desire of making profits (Yang, 2004). 
 
Like Hu Bo and Li Yang, Chen Daming also believes that 
DVD stores are likely to remain a feature of China’s film 
industry for some time to come.  However, unlike Hu and 
Li, who view piracy as something destined to remain 
illegal, Chen points out that incorporating DVDs into the 
existing business model helped to save the US film 
industry.  He believes that the sale of DVD rights and 
perhaps even the incorporation of DVD stores currently 
selling illegal versions of films within the legitimate 
distribution system may become important aspects of 
film’s business model in the future.(Chen, 2004) 
 
Given that one of the biggest obstacles facing China’s 
film industry is the absence of a regulated distribution 
mechanism accessible to both producers and 
consumers, incorporation of the existing pirate 
infrastructure for DVD distribution would indeed represent 
a powerful innovation for China’s entertainment industry.  
Rather than attempting to stamp these players out, 
regulating them and encouraging them to become part 
of a legitimate, royalty-producing distribution system 
would harness a potentially enormous source of revenue 
for Chinese filmmakers.  However, the practical obstacles 
to implementing such a plan are enormous.  Foreign 
copyright owners would need to give their consent and 
support to this type of initiative.  Even more important, 
however, would be the Chinese government’s willingness 
to shift its view of film products away from the political 
and towards the commercial.  Although China’s 
policymakers have made some remarkable turnarounds 
in the past, at present there seems to be little indication 
that such a radical shift is likely. 
 
Unregulated and Vulnerable: 
 
Some people are good at writing and directing 
– other people are good at ripping off.  
Everybody has different talents (Chen, 2004). 
 
China’s underground film industry has produced some 
fantastic creative works.  However, the fact that the 
industry is an ‘underground’ movement means that, by 
definition, it is outside the parameters of Chinese 
government regulation and control.  This raises a number 
of interesting legal questions.  For example, according to 
Chen, his first legitimate (above ground) film was copied 
by an underground filmmaker, who subsequently sent his 
film to international film festivals.  How well Chinese 
courts are able to deal with this kind of infringement is yet 
to be seen.  Can injunctions against the distribution of 
films which are being distributed illegally be brought?  If 
the courts did accept that an infringement had taken 
place, how damages could be calculated in relation to 
a sector that exists only illegally.  
 
Ultimately, no matter how brilliant or well received 
internationally the products of China’s underground film 
industry are, Chen and Bo are correct in their assessment 
that it cannot form the basis of a major commercial 
sector.  A successful commercial sector requires 
investment, infrastructure and regulation.  For any of this 
to exist the sector must operate within the parameters of 
legal activity.  Neither of these directors believes that the 
DVD industry, currently made up almost exclusively of 
pirated products, will disappear anytime soon.  Hu points 
out that this industry is driven by commerce, and that 
profit driven activities are bound to have a place in any 
free market economy.  The notion that the film industry 
could be driven by profit doesn’t seem to have occurred 
to him.  Chen, on the other hand, believes that the future 
of China’s film industry may lie in incorporating DVD 
operations into the legitimate industry.  As Chen points 
out, DVDs have saved the US film industry.  Embracing 
this distribution channel as an opportunity to move more 
film products into the homes of consumers has become 
an important source of profit for Hollywood productions.   
 
I’m a victim of piracy. The pirated CDs of my 
films are everywhere. The profit for each 
pirated CD is more than 100%, usually from 
125%to 150% (Yang, 2004). 
 
Conclusion: 
China’s domestic creative industries face many 
obstacles within the current regulatory environment.  
Strict government controls have made it difficult for 
filmmakers to adapt to a growingly competitive 
commercial environment.  China’s film industry is still 
affected by the legacy of communist attitudes towards 
the role of film as an important ideological tool, rather 
than as a commodity with a recognized economic 
value.  Box office revenues have fallen steadily over the 
past twenty years as income levels have grown while 
cinema has found itself competing with growing rates of 
home television, DVD and VCD ownership (Chu, 2002).  A 
pirated copy of a film on VCD is often cheaper than the 
cost of theatre admission (Wu, 2004).  As a result, the 
Chinese film industry is forced to rely on imported 
Hollywood products to make up the vast bulk of the 
industry’s box office revenues.   
 
Although piracy has given Chinese audiences 
unprecedented access to foreign products, Chinese film 
studios are struggling to produce films capable of 
winning mainstream audience attention.  While 
consumer entertainment options have expanded, 
China’s domestic film industry remains constrained by a 
complex regulatory environment.  In the context of 
digitization, the proliferation of pirated DVDs and the 
growing sophistication of audience taste, restrictions on 
content take on new significance.  A number of directors 
working within this industry believe that the nature of the 
government involvement in the film industry, particularly 
in terms of censorship, stultify creative development, 
hinder the commercial viability of Chinese films and 
actively discourage private finance and investment.  
According to Directors such as Li Yang, government 
interference is inhibiting the production of commercially 
viable films.  Until the government loosens censorship 
controls it is unlikely that a vibrant Chinese film industry 
will develop.   
 
In strong contrast to the position adopted by 
‘underground’ filmmakers, another group of Chinese 
filmmakers are committed to creating commercially 
viable film products within the framework set down by 
authorities.  According to Hu Bo and Chen Daming, 
bureaucratic requirements, including censorship 
guidelines, are just one of many factors surrounding the 
production and commercialization of modern film.  While 
a solid regulatory framework conducive to the 
development of a vibrant industry is important, 
censorship should be regarded as one of many 
challenges, no more or less taxing than finance, logistics, 
audience tastes, language or the availability of industry 
infrastructure (Chen, 2004) (Bo, 2004b).  Hu Bo, in 
particular, believes that the development of domestic 
film production is not being unduly hindered by 
censorship (Bo, 2004b).  Both Hu and Chen view film as a 
valuable opportunity to present a positive image of 
China to the world.   
 
Chen Daming’s conviction that it is possible to make 
entertaining, commercially viable film productions within 
existing regulatory frameworks exists in spite of his own 
struggles to gain approval for his last work Manhole.  In 
2002 Maria Ruggieri described Chen as ‘less positive’ 
about the censorship process than other young Chinese 
directors such as Gao Xiaosong (Ruggieri, 2002).  Gao 
simply went straight to DVD with his film Where Have All 
The Flowers Gone while he was waiting the two years it 
took to secure Film Bureau approval for cinema release.  
The fact that DVD release allowed Gao to circumvent 
the censorship process highlights the ridiculous 
inconsistency with which these regulations are applied.  
Daming, on the other hand, reported that he was forced 
to alter the original ending in his screenplay, carry out 
extensive editing and change the original title from the 
politically incorrect ‘Perfect Woman’  to ‘Manhole’, 
which carries no negative connotations in Chinese 
(Ruggieri, 2002).  
 
From the point of view of many Chinese filmmakers and 
musicians, who are unable to find legal distribution 
mechanisms for their work within China, piracy within the 
CCP does not necessarily represent a problem.  For 
many artists, simply having their work watched or heard 
within China is extremely important.  While income from 
copyright royalties would be ideal, many have 
accepted that China’s difficult domestic environment 
means that royalties are simply not something that they 
can expect to receive.  Alienating fans in a nation with 
piracy rates as high as China's simply doesn't make sense 
for most Chinese musicians. 
 
The challenges facing China’s film industry are a direct 
reflection of the transitional nature of the nation’s 
political and economic system.  While Communism has 
been abandoned in all but name, China remains a 
single party state and the Chinese Communist Party 
continues to exercise extensive control over domestic 
media.  It seems unlikely that the government will loosen 
censorship guidelines as they relate to film while media 
continues to be viewed as a political and ideological 
tool, rather than a primarily commercial sector.  
Controlling piracy also raises issues that are at the core of 
China’s governance and legal development.  
Corruption, administrative justice, organized crime and 
the Central Government’s ability to compel local and 
provincial governments to comply with national 
regulations are all highly sensitive issues.   
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